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On the Measurement of Strength of Preference in Units of Money 
 
Abstract 
We report an experimental study that aims to elicit monetary measures of strength of 
preference in choices involving pairs of risky prospects. Despite extensive testing to refine 
the instruments used, we find that these money measures are systematically biased upwards 
relative to subsequent binary choices. We discuss possible reasons for this bias and its 
broader implications. [56 words] 
 
JEL classification: D81, C91. 





This paper investigates the possibility of eliciting accurate monetary measures of strength of 
preference using incentive-compatible experimental methods. 
The ability to judge the strength of preference (SoP) for one item over another, 
measured in money units, is central to microeconomics, and is often assumed to be a routine 
part of economic behaviour. For example, manufacturers of durable goods such as cars, 
television sets, computers, etc. customarily produce a range of products with different levels 
of quality and different prices and let consumers judge whether the quality differences are 
more or less valuable to them than the price differentials.  
While this kind of market transaction is attractive because individuals are observed 
when making decisions in real-world settings under real monetary incentives, it often does 
not provide sufficiently detailed information to accurately measure SoP. In many instances, 
an individual’s dichotomous decision as to whether or not to buy a product with a given level 
of quality is all that can be observed. By using laboratory experiments, we can overcome this 
limitation of field data, and at the same time try to devise an incentive system that induces 
individuals to accurately report their SoP judgments on a money scale. However, as we shall 
see, many individuals do not seem to find it straightforward to make this kind of judgment 
without systematic biases – at least, not in the realm we investigate. 
 Our focus is upon the elicitation of money differentials between the kinds of simple 
lotteries that are widely used in experimental studies of decision making under risk. The 
objective of many of these studies was to discriminate between alternative theoretical models, 
a task that SoP measures have the potential to facilitate. In their review of deterministic and 
probabilistic theories, Luce and Suppes (1965) wrote: “. . . the intuitive idea of representing 
the strength of preference in terms of a numerical utility function – in terms of a subjective 
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scale – is much too appealing to be abruptly dropped. Indeed, no-one has yet dropped it at all; 
every theory that we examine includes such a notion . . .” (p. 332–3). 
The most commonly used technique in studies of decision-making under risk is binary 
choice between lotteries. This is partly because the binary preference relation is widely taken 
to be the fundamental building block of decision theory. And it is partly because the binary 
choice task is easily understood by participants in experiments and can be related simply and 
directly to monetary incentives: if participants are paid according to the outcome of the 
lottery they have chosen, they stand to benefit most by reporting their preferences carefully 
and accurately. However, if the theories under study entail substantial overlapping between 
the sets of decisions that they allow, binary choices alone may be somewhat blunt 
instruments: as in the case of field data, dichotomous responses provide only limited 
information, especially when the range of choices presented to a sample of respondents has to 
be broad enough to span the considerable heterogeneity between individuals.  
In an attempt to deal with this limitation, some studies have asked each participant to 
make a large number of choices and have then used econometric methods to try to reach a 
view about which theory provides the best fit to each individual’s decisions: for an example 
of such an attempt, see Hey and Orme (1994). While this approach may be regarded as in the 
mainstream economic tradition, it has several drawbacks – not least, the demands it may 
make on each participant in terms of the volume of responses, and its sensitivity to different 
assumptions about functional form and stochastic specification (see, for example, Wilcox 
2008, Blavatskyy and Pogrebna 2010, and Bardsley et al. 2010, chapter 7). 
An alternative approach is to supplement basic choice data with more direct 
information about the degree to which one alternative is judged better than the other – a 
difference which we refer to as subjective SoP. In decision analysis, it has also been common 
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to elicit subjective SoP judgments (e.g., von Winterfeld and Edwards, 1986), when use of a 
monetary scale is impractical.  
In recent research (Butler et al. 2012, 2014), some of us have built on earlier work 
(see also Mellers and Biagini 1994; Birnbaum et al. 1999) to explore the extent to which SoP 
judgments expressed in verbal and/or Likert scale form might provide additional insights into 
the structure of preferences. We found the SoP distributions to respond clearly and in the 
expected direction to changes in both the payoffs and the probabilities of the choice options, 
allowing us to detect systematic tendencies in people’s underlying preferences even when 
their observed choices did not change.   
In this paper, we report the results of the last of a series of experiments in which we 
tried to elicit monetary measures of strength of preference – henceforth MSoP. Relative to 
their subjective counterparts, such measures are appealing for a number of reasons. First, a 
monetary scale has a clearly defined zero and unit of measurement, which allows clear 
comparisons between pairs of options in the same way as a cardinal utility scale does. 
Second, MSoP can be more readily compared across individuals. Third, it can be linked to a 
standard incentive-compatible mechanism. If MSoP could be elicited accurately, a strong 
case could be made to include MSoP as a useful addition to the economists’ toolkit.  
Unfortunately, despite our best attempts to develop and refine the MSoP instrument, 
we encountered some difficulties which could not be resolved. We do not yet have a fully-
formed explanation for the regularities we found, but since they appear to challenge 
assumptions about people’s ability to express their SoP for one item over another in money 
terms, they raise questions which merit further investigation.  
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. In Section 2, we describe the 
mechanism we used to elicit MSoP and the logic of our tests designed to detect systematic 
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biases in MSoP judgments. In Section 3, we present our experimental design and key results. 
In Section 4, we discuss various candidate explanations for our findings and their possible 
wider implications. 
 
II. Incentive-compatible elicitation of monetary strength of preference 
Our aim was to elicit the amount of money that expresses how strongly an individual prefers 
lottery A over lottery B: that is, we sought to identify the amount of money that needs to be 
added to each consequence of the less preferred lottery to make it exactly as attractive as the 
preferred lottery. This approach has been advocated, for example, in the influential book on 
decision analysis ‘Smart Decisions’ (Hammond et al, 1999) in which it was called the ‘even 
swap’. It is more direct and arguably less prone to ‘noise’ or error than comparing two 
separately elicited certainty equivalences and avoids the possible complications associated 
with the ‘preference reversal’ phenomenon (see Seidl, 2002).  
In this paper, we confine our attention to pairs of lotteries which between them 
involve no more than three monetary payoffs a > b > c ≥ 0, although, as noted in the previous 
section, the assumption that individuals can make MSoP judgments is quite general in the 
way economists model preferences. 
Let lottery A offer payoff a with probability p and payoff c with probability 1 – p, 
denoted by A = (a, p; c, 1 – p); and let B = (b, q; c, 1 – q). Suppose that an individual weakly 
prefers A to B. Her task is to state an amount of money, m, to be added to B. Let m* ≥ 0 
denote the amount of money which, when added to all consequences of B, makes it as 
attractive as A.  That is, m* is the amount of money such that A ~ B*, where ‘~’ denotes 
indifference and where B* = (b + m*, q; c + m*, 1 – q).  
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Notice that, in this context, respect for first-order stochastic dominance (FOSD) 
imposes some bounds on m*. For someone who strictly prefers A to B when p > q, it must 
hold that c + m* < a, i.e. m* < a – c, otherwise B* would stochastically dominate A, 
contradicting the assumption that A ~ B*. Similarly, if p ≤ q, respect for FOSD requires that b 
+ m* < a, i.e. m* < a – b. 
 We now turn to the question of how m* might be elicited in a way that is incentive-
compatible. At this point we focus on the general principle and leave detailed issues of 
implementation until we describe the experimental design. 
For each pair of lotteries, {A, B}, the procedure involves two stages. First, the 
individual is asked to choose which of A or B she prefers. Then she is asked to state the 
amount of money that would need to be added to each consequence of the non-chosen 
lottery1 to make it as attractive to her as the lottery she initially chose. Once a pair in the 
experiment is selected to be paid for real (only one decision is played out for real), the 
individual flips a coin to determine whether she will be paid on the basis of playing out the 
lottery she chose in the first stage or whether she will be paid according to her second stage 
MSoP response.  
In the latter case, we use a variant of the Becker-DeGroot-Marschak (1964) 
mechanism (henceforth BDM). The individual blindly draws a sum of money – the random 
amount – by picking one envelope from a set of opaque envelopes, each of which contains a 
different sum. The distribution of these amounts is unknown to the individual. If the random 
amount is less than or equal to her stated MSoP, she gets to play the lottery she chose in the 
first stage, because according to her MSoP response the random amount is too small to alter 
her decision. If the random amount is larger, she gets to play the modified lottery obtained by 
                                                          
1 Throughout the paper, we will often use the phrase ‘added to the non-chosen lottery’ to mean that the same 
amount is added to all consequences of that lottery. 
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adding the random amount to the lottery she did not choose originally, because according to 
her MSoP response, the addition of the random amount to the unchosen lottery now 
constitutes a new lottery that is preferable to the one she chose initially.  
Lotteries are played out by drawing one of 100 numbered discs from an opaque bag. 
The payoff associated with each number can be clearly identified by looking at the lottery 
display. An example of the display for a lottery which pays £10 with 50% probability 
(numbers 1 to 50) and £8 with 50% probability (numbers 51 to 100) is given in Figure 1. 
Figure 1 about here 
Conditional on the participant choosing her preferred lottery, this procedure is 
incentive compatible in the same sense as the standard BDM. Misreporting her ‘true’ MSoP 
will make the individual worse off whenever the random amount falls between her true and 
stated MSoP. If this is a result of understating her true MSoP, she gets to play a modified 
lottery which is inferior to her chosen lottery. If it is a result of overstating, she fails to play a 
superior modified lottery and plays her originally chosen lottery instead.2  
It might be argued that this is more complicated than the standard BDM, and may 
invite some strategic behaviour. For example, some individuals might try to end up with a 
better outcome in the MSoP task by choosing the less preferred lottery in the first stage and 
then stating the minimum m (zero) as their MSoP. The thinking behind such a strategy is as 
follows. Suppose an individual truly prefers A to B and her true MSoP is m*. However, she 
believes that the average value of the random amount – call this r – is greater than m*. She 
therefore supposes that if she misreports that she prefers B to A and states an MSoP close to 
zero, there is a 0.5 chance that she will be paid according to her first-stage choice response 
                                                          
2 Notice that, as in the standard BDM, there are forms of misreporting that do not make the participant worse 
off. When she understates her true MSoP but the random amount is even lower than her stated MSoP, or when 
she overstates but the random amount is even higher, the procedure has the same implications for her as in the 
case she correctly reports her true MSoP. For this reason, it is often said that in the BDM procedure truthful 
revelation of one’s preferences (assuming these exist) is a weakly dominant strategy. 
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and have to play B rather than A (thereby being worse off by m*); but there is a 0.5 chance 
that she will be paid according to her second-stage response and play A enhanced by the 
random amount, which on average takes the value r. If she believes r is greater than m*, it 
may seem that this strategy will on average make her better off. Although this reasoning is 
flawed, we aimed to pre-empt any such behaviour by telling participants (truthfully) that the 
set of envelopes from which the random amount was drawn contained an equal number of 
negative and positive amounts (with zero as the middle value). This meant that even if they 
stated an MSoP close to zero, they would be paid according to their first-stage choice every 
time a negative random amount was drawn. In other words, misreporting one’s choice would 
result in the individual playing out her less preferred lottery at least 75% of the time and they 
would have to believe r to be very much higher than m* (in spite of the middle value of the 
distribution of random amounts being zero) in order to suppose that this risk could be offset 
by misreporting their preference.  
Moreover, we can check the data to see whether such sophisticated strategic 
misreporting is a genuine issue. Remember that, in order to maximise her chances of 
benefiting from choosing the less-preferred lottery, the individual must state the minimum 
possible amount in the MSoP task (which is zero in all cases). Thus, the number of 
individuals who state an MSoP of exactly zero provides an upper bound on the number of 
strategically biased responses (an MSoP of zero is also the answer that we would expect from 
an individual who is indifferent, or who realises that he chose the less preferred option by 
mistake and wants to minimise the potential loss). 
An essential part of the development of our MSoP instrument consists in devising a 
method for evaluating its performance. In this paper, we do this by comparing a participant’s 
MSoP judgment to her subsequent choices in pairs constructed by adding a predetermined 
positive amount (i.e. independent of her stated MSoP) to the lottery she had not chosen in the 
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initial stage. If MSoP judgments are unbiased, they should on average be consistent with the 
choices made in these subsequent tasks. 
The logic of our test is as follows. Suppose the individual has chosen lottery A over 
lottery B and stated an MSoP equal to m. At a later stage, she is presented with a new pair in 
which an amount of money m1 has been added to B, i.e. {A, B + m1} with m1 > 0. Clearly, we 
cannot expect absolute precision and accuracy in every stated m – it is well known that many 
responses exhibit some degree of noise/variability – but if the MSoP judgments are not 
systematically biased relative to choices, we would expect the number of participants who 
overstate their MSoP to be roughly equal to the number of those who understate it. In relation 
to the choices made in the new pair, if a participant has overstated her MSoP, i.e. m > m*, 
then she might switch to an improved B when the improvement is strictly less than her stated 
MSoP, i.e. m1 < m. In this case, we will say that the individual is switching too early relative 
to where she should switch according to her MSoP judgment, m. Similarly, if the participant 
has understated her MSoP, i.e. m < m*, she might fail to switch to the improved B when the 
improvement is strictly greater than her stated MSoP, i.e. m1 > m. When this happens, we will 
say that the individual is switching too late relative to her expected switching point.  
We decided to use two values for each pair in order to get some feel for the magnitude 
of the observed overstating or understating. So someone who chooses A in the first stage will 
later be presented not only with {A, B + m1} but also with {A, B + m2}, where m1 < m2, with 
these choices being separated by a number of others to reduce the chance that respondents 
would make any connection between them. 
 
III. The Experiment 
3.1   Design 
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The experiment was divided into two parts.  
In part 1, every participant completed four different tasks for each of 20 pairs of 
lotteries constructed on the basis of some of the most common regularities in choice under 
risk. For each pair, participants were asked to choose one of the lotteries, state their 
confidence in their choice, report an SoP judgment on a (non-incentivised) Likert scale, and 
state their MSoP. While these four tasks were always faced in the same order, the order of the 
pairs was determined at random for each participant.3  
In part 2, participants faced two extra choices for each of the 20 pairs in part 1, while 
still reporting their confidence and (non-monetary) SoP, but not their MSoP. These new pairs 
were constructed by adding, in turn, one of two predetermined positive amounts, 0 < m1 < m2, 
to each of the consequences of the lotteries that were not chosen in part 1. The order in which 
the resulting 40 pairs were presented was randomised independently for each participant, 
subject to the constraint that the first 20 should contain 10 small increments and 10 large 
increments, and similarly for the last 20 pairs. As explained in the previous Section, these 
pairs are designed to detect any systematic distortions in MSoP judgments.4 
In designing our experiment, we took a number of steps to give our MSoP instrument 
the best chances to succeed – that is, to provide us with monetary measures of strength of 
preference in line with the stakes involved in the various lotteries that we used. These steps 
were informed by extensive piloting. Before this main laboratory study, we conducted two 
smaller pilots (with 44 and 40 participants respectively), followed by a larger online pilot 
study (with 252 participants) in which we only elicited choices and MSoP. More details on 
these pilot studies can be found in the online Appendix. 
                                                          
3 For the purposes of this paper, we will not consider the confidence judgments and the SoP measured on a 
Likert scale any further. More information is available from the authors upon request. 
4 The instructions for the experiment can be found at: 
http://www.danielnavarromartinez.net/pagessop/finalindex.htm. After the welcome page, the full instructions 
can be accessed by clicking on the University of Warwick logo. 
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Learning from these pilot studies, we developed an MSoP instrument that allowed 
participants to visualise the implications of their MSoP judgment before they confirmed their 
decision. An individual entered his/her MSoP by pressing ‘Up’ and ‘Down’ buttons, which 
were shown next to the non-chosen lottery, to adjust all payoffs of the non-chosen lottery in 
10 pence increments until the respondent judged the resulting lottery to be ‘equally desirable’ 
as the lottery that was initially chosen.5 A screenshot of the MSoP task is shown in Figure 2. 
Figure 2 about here 
We refined the explanation of the MSoP incentive mechanism to be as clear as we 
could make it. To this end, we went through two examples that illustrated why it is optimal to 
state one’s MSoP as accurately as possible and why misreporting one’s MSoP could result in 
suboptimal outcomes.6 
We also wanted to reduce the likelihood that any systematic overstatement of MSoP 
was due to lack of familiarity with the task. Therefore, we only invited to the main laboratory 
study those participants who had participated in the online study and who had thereby had 
experience with a number of MSoP elicitation tasks.  
 
3.2   The lottery pairs   
                                                          
5 The ‘Down’ button could only be used once some money had been added, and the final added amount could 
never be negative. In the refinement of our instrument, we also considered an alternative to this buttons 
treatment in which the participant entered her MSoP in a box and could then press a button to visualise the 
resulting lottery – the boxes treatment. We found that the buttons treatment led to significantly lower MSoP 
statements, and that is why we implemented it in the main study. See the online Appendix for further details. 
6 In the online pilot study, we considered the implications of the incentive system in some detail. We had a full 
treatment in which the MSoP tasks could be paid for real, and a partial treatment in which they were not. We 
wanted to check whether the intricacies of the incentive mechanism were responsible for the substantial 
overstatement of MSoP, but we found no systematic difference between the two versions. Our instructions also 
included a third example that illustrated why it would not make sense to misreport one’s choice to obtain the 
preferred lottery and some money in case the MSoP task was paid for real. Since we found no evidence of this 
kind of sophisticated strategic behaviour (see Section 3.3), we removed this example to further simplify the 
instructions. See the online Appendix for further details. 
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The 20 lottery pairs used in the experiment are reported in Table 1. For each pair, the table 
reports the pair label, the parameters of the two lotteries, and the two amounts, m1 and m2,  
that were added to each consequence of the non-chosen lottery in the second part of the 
experiment. The 20 pairs are divided into two subsets: four first-order stochastic dominance 
(FOSD) pairs, shown in the top panel of Table 1, and sixteen ‘safe-risky’ (SR) pairs, shown 
in the bottom panel. 
Table 1 about here 
The FOSD pairs all featured the same dominated lottery – (£35, 0.35; £0, 0.65) – which was 
pitted against a dominating alternative that was obtained by improving the money dimension 
(‘m’) by either £1.40 or £10 in either an overlapping (‘o’) display (in which both lotteries 
give a positive prize for numbers 1 to 35) or a disjoint (‘d’) display (in which the dominated 
lottery gives a positive prize for number 1 to 35 and the dominating lottery gives a positive 
prize for numbers 66 to 100). This gives four pairs, identified by the dominating lottery: 
mo1.40 with (£36.4, 0.35; £0, 0.65), mo10 with (£45, 0.35; £0, 0.65), md1.40 with (£0, 0.65; 
£36.4, 0.35) and md10 with (£0, 0.65; £45, 0.35). The amounts added in the second part of 
the experiment were £0.50 and £1 for mo1.40 and md1.40, and £2 and £4 for mo10 and 
md10. 
These tasks provide a simple but crucial test. In each of these pairs there is a choice 
prescribed by respect for FOSD, which is an assumption of most theories of decision-making 
under risk. We can check the extent to which respondents respect FOSD when it is 
reasonably easy to detect. If FOSD is respected by most participants in those choices, but if 
they then go on to give MSoP responses which imply violation of FOSD (see Section II), this 
allows us to screen out individuals who may not have fully understood the MSoP task.7 In the 
                                                          
7 As an example, consider the first FOSD pair, mo1.40. An individual choosing the dominating lottery (£36.40, 
0.35; £0, 0.65) who goes on to state an MSoP equal to (or exceeding) £1.40 would be violating FOSD. Suppose 
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remainder of our analysis, we will restrict our attention to the individuals who respected 
FOSD in all four choices and in all four MSoP responses in these pairs.  
The remaining sixteen pairs are named safe-risky (SR) pairs because they all feature a 
relatively safe lottery and a relatively risky lottery, where the latter always has greater 
expected value (EV). For all these pairs, m1 equals £2 and m2 equals £4. By contrast with the 
FOSD questions, in the SR pairs either lottery can legitimately be chosen given particular risk 
attitudes, but the range over which the MSoP can be expressed without violating FOSD 
varies considerably depending on which lottery is chosen. Therefore, these pairs allow us to 
see whether MSoP behaves systematically differently in a variety of situations. 
 
3.3   Results 
The 113 participants were University of Warwick students recruited from the Decision 
Research at Warwick (DR@W) database.8 They all had previous experience with the MSoP 
task in the large online pilot study. In order to make our tests as stringent and conservative as 
possible, we will restrict our analysis to the 89 participants who always respected FOSD in 
the four questions designed to detect violations.9 The average sum received by participants 
was £12.61, ranging from a low of zero to a high of £62.70. 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
she stated an MSoP of exactly £1.40. Then, the lottery resulting from adding this amount to both consequences 
of the dominated lottery would be (£36.40, 0.35; £1.40, 0.65) which is as good as the chosen lottery when both 
pay £36.40, and strictly better when the new lottery pays £1.40 instead of nothing. 
8 At the time of the experiment this was a customised version of the ORSEE software (Greiner 2004). 
9 For these 89 participants, there is only one instance in which the stated MSoP violates dominance in the 
remaining sixteen pairs (one participant did so in pair SR16). Of the 24 excluded participants, 22 never chose 
the dominated option in the four FOSD pairs, but stated an MSoP value that entailed a violation of dominance (6 
individuals did so once, 15 twice and 1 three times); 1 individual chose the dominated option once but did not 
violate FOSD in his/her four MSoP statements; and 1 individual chose the dominated option twice and violated 
FOSD in all four MSoP statements. The exclusion of these participants is meant to make our tests as 
conservative as possible. Had these participants been included in our analysis, the patterns we observe would 
have been even more pronounced. 
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Before we turn to the main results, we briefly consider the issue of strategic 
misreporting mentioned in Section 2. As we explained, the number of participants who state 
an MSoP of exactly zero provides an upper bound for the number of times the less-preferred 
lottery might have been chosen in part 1 in order to receive an improved preferred lottery in 
part 2. Out of the 1424 responses (16 for each of the 89 participants in the SR pairs), only two 
(that is, 0.14%) were exactly zero. Strategic misreporting must then have occurred between 
zero and two times and is thus not an issue in the data. 
The experimental results are reported in Table 2 for the FOSD pairs and Table 3 for 
the SR pairs. We begin with the FOSD pairs. 
Table 2 about here 
The top panel of Table 2 shows, for each of the four FOSD pairs, the parameters of the 
dominated and dominating lotteries, the money increment that was used to obtain the 
dominating lottery, the EV difference (favouring the dominating lottery), the number of 
individuals who violated dominance in the initial choice, and the number of individuals who, 
having initially chosen the dominating option, went on to state an MSoP that entailed a 
violation of FOSD. 
 The last two rows of the top panel show that, while it is quite rare for participants to 
violate dominance in a straight choice between two lotteries (even in the disjoint displays in 
which the dominance relation is less obvious), it is not uncommon for them to state an MSoP 
that entails a FOSD violation, especially for the pairs with the small money increment 
(mo1.40 and md1.40). As we explained in the previous section, we use this information to 
restrict our sample to the 89 participants who did not commit any of these types of violations. 
This makes our tests particularly conservative so that the MSoP elicitation is given the best 
chance to succeed. 
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 The second panel of Table 2 reports the mean, median and standard deviation of 
MSoP in the four FOSD pairs for the restricted sample. Two aspects of the data are 
noteworthy. The first is that there seems to be very little difference between MSoP for 
overlapping and disjoint displays.10 This indicates that this variation in displays is not 
interacting with the process through which participants state their MSoP. The second aspect 
is that mean (and median) MSoP exceeds the EV difference for the pairs with the small 
money increment, but not for the pairs with the large EV difference. While one might expect 
an MSoP valuation below the EV difference for risk averse individuals, in line with what is 
typically found in experiments investigating choice under risk, an MSoP greater than the EV 
difference might either be interpreted as a tendency for risk loving (which would be odd if the 
same individuals manifest risk-aversion in the other pairs) or as a tendency to overstate their 
MSoP. 
 The last panel of Table 2 contains our tests for systematic over- or understatement of 
MSoP. These tests use the choices that participants made in the second part of the 
experiment, in which two different positive amounts were added at different points in part 2 
to both consequences of the non-chosen (in this case, the dominated) lottery. These amounts 
are shown in that panel. We test for systematic tendencies by comparing the proportions of 
participants who switched too early (i.e. for an amount strictly lower than their stated MSoP) 
and participants who switched too late (i.e. did not switch for an amount strictly greater than 
their stated MSoP), as explained in Section 2.  
The picture that emerges from Table 2 is unmistakeable. In all eight comparisons, the 
proportion of early switches is significantly greater than that of late switches (at the 1% level 
in five, at the 5% level in two cases and at the 10% level in one), indicating that the stated 
                                                          
10 In fact, the same holds true if one compares the cases in which the dominating option offers a larger payoff 
with cases in which the dominating option offers a greater chance of the same payoff: the means of MSoP are 
very close and most medians are identical. See the results of the online pilot in the Appendix. 
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MSoP does not in fact make the participant indifferent between the chosen and improved 
lottery, but rather that the improved lottery often tends to be chosen even when the 
improvement is strictly less than the stated MSoP. The tasks with the large increment (mo10 
and md10) are particularly indicative in this respect, because the £2 and the £4 happen to split 
the sample asymmetrically in opposite directions (as the median MSoP is £3 and £3.50 
respectively). This shows that the tendency for overstatement is a robust feature of these data. 
Next we consider the results for the SR pairs, presented in Table 3. 
Table 3 about here 
The structure of Table 3 is similar to that of Table 2. In the first panel, we show the safe and 
risky lottery of each pair, and the EV difference favouring the risky lottery. The second panel 
reports summaries of MSoP for individuals who chose the safe lottery. That is, it shows how 
much money would need to be added to the risky lottery to make it as desirable as the chosen 
safe lottery. Panel two also indicates how many of the 89 individuals chose each lottery, and 
reports the upper bound for MSoP: that is, the lowest MSoP amount that entails a violation of 
dominance. The third panel is analogous to the second, except it refers to individuals who 
chose the risky lottery rather than the safe lottery. The final two panels report our statistical 
tests, in the same format as in Table 2. However, splitting the sample according to whether 
the safe or the risky lottery was initially chosen sometimes means that we do not have enough 
observations for our statistical tests. This is indicated by a † symbol. 
 The mean and median MSoP responses often appear to be quite different for safe and 
risky choices. This seems to be particularly the case for the pairs in which there is a great 
disparity between the ranges over which MSoP can be expressed. For instance, the difference 
in MSoP values is substantial in pairs SR4 and SR5, in which the upper bound for MSoP is 
£5 for participants who choose safe and £55 for participants who choose risky. A similar 
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pattern can be found in pair SR1, with upper bounds of £30 and £10 for safe and risky 
respectively (but interestingly not in pairs SR2 and SR3, which have the same bounds), in 
pairs SR9 and SR15, with upper bounds of £9 and £36, and in pairs SR10 and SR14, with 
upper bounds of £15 and £30. These asymmetries suggest that the trends  we observe in our 
MSoP data may be influenced by the differences between the larger payoffs of the two 
lotteries. We will come back to this issue in the discussion. 
 Our statistical tests, reported in the last two panels of Table 3, give a general picture 
that is quite consistent with our findings for the FOSD pairs. There are 64 possible 
comparisons (four for each of the 16 SR pairs). In 5 cases, the low number of observations 
does not allow us to conduct a meaningful statistical test. Out of the remaining 59 cases, we 
find a significant result in the usual direction in 41 cases (at the 1% level in 32 cases, at the 
5% level in 4 and at the 10% level in the remaining 5 cases), no significance in 16 cases and a 
significant result in the opposite direction in just 2.  
So in the great majority of cases we observe early switches outnumbering late 
switches, consistent with a tendency for MSoP to be overstated. This is true even for the 
people who state an MSoP exactly equal to £2 or £4. Summing over the sixteen SR pairs, 
these equalities happen in 261 cases. In 234 (89.7%) of these, the participant switches when 
offered the corresponding added amount (either £2 or £4). Under the null hypothesis that a 
participant who states an MSoP exactly equal to the added amount is as likely to switch as 
she is to stick to the originally chosen lottery, the likelihood of this happening by chance is 
virtually zero. This is further evidence of a strong tendency for the MSoP measures to be 
overstated. 
 
IV. Discussion and conclusion 
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In this paper, we have reported an experiment designed to elicit measures of strength of 
preference in units of money (MSoP). The idea that people can judge the amount of money 
that compensates for a difference in quality or subjective value between different options is 
fundamental to standard economic analysis. The substantial bias that we discovered suggests 
that things are not so straightforward. Recall that our elicitation instrument and the 
explanation of the incentive system were refined through extensive piloting; that all our 
participants were required to have previous experience with the task; and that we restricted 
our analysis to the most consistent individuals. In other words, we endeavoured to give the 
MSoP elicitation procedure the best chance to succeed that we could devise. Despite this, the 
outcome of our battery of tests is unequivocal: there is a pervasive tendency for MSoP to be 
overstated. 
 In the remainder of this Section, we speculate on the possible causes of this 
systematic distortion and offer suggestions for future research. 
 One possible explanation is that we are encountering some form of ‘endowment 
effect’ (e.g. Thaler, 1980; Knetsch, 1989; Kahneman et al., 1990). By asking the participant 
to make an initial choice, we may privilege the initially-chosen option. The MSoP task may 
then be interpreted as a ‘willingness to accept’ task by the participant, which has a tendency 
to exceed the corresponding ‘willingness to pay’ valuation. Although we cannot rule out this 
possibility, we did try to frame our instructions neutrally in that respect, by asking 
participants to report ‘how much money would have to be added to the lottery [they] didn't 
choose to make it exactly as desirable as the one [they] did choose’. We did not refer to the 
BDM sum as a ‘price’ but as a ‘random amount’. And in the feedback we received from our 
questionnaires in the pilot studies, this notion of selling the chosen lottery back to the 
experimenter was never mentioned. But we cannot rule out the possibility that some 
interpreted their MSoP as a compensation for accepting the less desired lottery in the pair. 
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 A somewhat different explanation is that the overstatement of MSoP is caused by a 
form of post-decision ‘consolidation’ or ‘bolstering’ (e.g. Svenson et al. 2009) or perhaps 
some element of confirmation bias or reduction of dissonance (Festinger, 1957). The 
argument goes as follows. The MSoP judgment was made soon after one of the lotteries had 
been chosen. Since making a choice requires the participant to identify the differences 
between the two options, the large values of MSoP that we observe may be a consequence of 
us asking the question at the moment in which the two lotteries feel most different to the 
subject (i.e. bolstering is at its strongest). Moreover, a larger MSoP also affirms, and is 
consonant with, the correctness of the choice just made. By this account, we should observe 
less of an overstatement if we asked the two questions at different times during the 
experiment – a possibility that might be examined in future work. 
 A third possibility, suggested to us during an informal debriefing of participants, is 
that the overstatement of MSoP is due to some kind of overweighting of the non-zero payoffs 
while paying insufficient attention to the zeros and the probabilities involved.11 Some 
evidence consistent with this possibility can be found by considering pairs of questions where 
the upper bound MSoP stays the same but where the probabilities of both the positive payoffs 
are reduced substantially while the probabilities of receiving nothing are correspondingly 
increased.  
For example, consider SR4 and SR5. The two lotteries in SR5 involve probabilities of 
£5 and £60 which are only one quarter of the corresponding probabilities in SR4, so that the 
EV and the EV difference are both reduced by 75%. However, the median MSoP falls by no 
more than 25% and the mean MSoP is reduced by an even smaller proportion. Similar 
patterns can be found when comparing SR3 with SR2, SR6 with SR13, SR9 with SR12 and 
                                                          
11 This point was also made by several participants in the University of Sydney 2011 Winter School who 
completed the experiment as a learning exercise and who reflected on the experience shortly afterwards. Their 
responses were not used in our analyses. 
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SR10 with SR11: in the first three comparisons, the EV differences fall by 75% or 80% but 
the MSoP means and medians never fall by more than 40%; and in the final comparison, the 
EV difference falls by 75% while the means and medians fall by between 20% and 50%.  
By contrast, when respondents are later presented with straight choices where the 
extra £2 or £4 have already been added to all payoffs of the initially non-chosen option, it 
may be that they place greater weight on the probability of receiving at least some positive 
payoff, thereby producing a choice-matching disparity analogous to those reported by 
Tversky et al. (1988).  
The possibilities outlined above do not seem to us to be mutually exclusive, and nor 
do we claim they represent an exhaustive list of potential explanations. Further experimental 
designs might investigate them more thoroughly. Meanwhile, our results suggest that, for 
whatever reasons, the provision of incentive compatible mechanisms in conjunction with 
transparent elicitation procedures presented to participants with prior experience of the tasks 
is not sufficient to eliminate serious and seemingly systematic discrepancies between choice 
and equivalence procedures. 
It would be interesting to explore the robustness of these findings in other settings, 
e.g. consumer behaviour with respect to the kinds of goods often sold in the marketplace. If 
the same systematic patterns are prevalent in those environments, there may be important 
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Table 1 – The lottery pairs 
Dominance pair Dominated lottery Dominating lottery m1 m2 
     
mo1.40 (£35, 0.35; £0, 0.65) (£36.4, 0.35; £0, 0.65) 0.5 1 
mo10 (£35, 0.35; £0, 0.65) (£45, 0.35; £0, 0.65) 2 4 
md1.40 (£35, 0.35; £0, 0.65) (£0, 0.65; £36.4, 0.35) 0.5 1 
md10 (£35, 0.35; £0, 0.65) (£0, 0.65; £45, 0.35) 2 4 
     
SR pair Safe lottery Risky lottery m1 m2 
     
SR1 (£30, 1) (£40, 0.8; £0, 0.2) 2 4 
SR2 (£30, 0.25; £0, 0.75) (£40, 0.2; £0, 0.8) 2 4 
SR3 (£30, 0.05; £0, 0.95) (£40, 0.04; £0, 0.96) 2 4 
SR4 (£5, 1) (£60, 0.2; £0, 0.8) 2 4 
SR5 (£5, 0.25; £0, 0.75) (£60, 0.05; £0, 0.95) 2 4 
SR6 (£9, 0.25; £0, 0.75) (£15, 0.2; £0, 0.8) 2 4 
SR7 (£15, 0.2; £0, 0.8) (£25, 0.15; £0, 0.85) 2 4 
SR8 (£25, 0.15; £0, 0.85) (£45, 0.1; £0, 0.9) 2 4 
SR9 (£9, 0.25; £0, 0.75) (£45, 0.1; £0, 0.9) 2 4 
SR10 (£15, 0.2; £0, 0.8) (£45, 0.1; £0, 0.9) 2 4 
SR11 (£15, 0.8; £0, 0.2) (£45, 0.4; £0, 0.6) 2 4 
SR12 (£9, 1) (£45, 0.4; £0, 0.6) 2 4 
SR13 (£9, 1) (£15, 0.8; £0, 0.2) 2 4 
SR14 (£18, 0.8; £3, 0.2) (£48, 0.4; £3, 0.6) 2 4 
SR15 (£12, 1) (£48, 0.4; £3, 0.6) 2 4 
SR16 (£12, 1) (£18, 0.8; £3, 0.2) 2 4 
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Table 2 – Experimental results: FOSD pairs 
  mo1.40 mo10 md1.40 md10 
Dominated lottery (£35, 0.35; £0, 0.65) (£35, 0.35; £0, 0.65) (£35, 0.35; £0, 0.65) (£35, 0.35; £0, 0.65) 
Dominating lottery (£36.4, 0.35; £0, 0.65) (£45, 0.35; £0, 0.65) (£0, 0.65; £36.4, 0.35) (£0, 0.65; £45, 0.35) 
Increment 1.40 10 1.40 10 
EV difference 0.49  3.50  0.49  3.50  
Dominated first-stage choices 1 0 1 1 
Dominance violations MSoP 18 4 19 2 
Summary MSoP:a 
    Mean 0.66 3.21 0.66 3.32 
Median 0.60 3.00 0.60 3.50 
St. Dev. 0.24 1.21 0.25 1.19 
Too early vs. Too Late:a,b 
    £0.50 added 46/80 vs. 2/9* 
 
44/82 vs. 1/7* 
 
 
(57.5% vs. 22.2%) 
 
(53.7% vs. 14.3%) 
 £1 added 17/18 vs. 4/71*** 
 
17/20 vs. 2/69*** 
 
 
(94.4% vs. 5.6%) 
 
(85% vs. 2.9%) 
 £2 added 
 
44/79 vs. 1/10*** 
 
42/80 vs. 1/9** 
  
(55.7% vs. 10%) 
 
(52.5% vs. 11.1%) 
£4 added 
 
23/28 vs. 5/61*** 
 
27/32 vs. 2/54*** 
    (82.1% vs. 8.2%)   (84.4% vs. 3.7%) 
a - Sample restricted to 89 participants who violated dominance neither in their choices nor in their MSoP judgments for the four FOSD pairs. 





Table 3 – Experimental results: SR pairs 
  SR1 SR2 SR3 SR4 SR5 
Safe lottery (£30, 1) (£30, 0.25; £0, 0.75) (£30, 0.05; £0, 0.95) (£5, 1) (£5, 0.25; £0, 0.75) 
Risky lottery (£40, 0.8; £0, 0.2) (£40, 0.2; £0, 0.8) (£40, 0.04; £0, 0.96) (£60, 0.2; £0, 0.8) (£60, 0.05; £0, 0.95) 
EV difference  2.00  0.50  0.10  7.00  1.75  
Summary MSoP (Safe chosen; m added to Risky):a 
N. 76 30 6 36 25 
Mean  5.18 2.31 1.50 1.80 1.56 
Median 5.00 2.00 1.35 2.00 1.50 
St. Dev. 3.64 1.71 1.18 0.72 0.87 
Upper bound MSoP 30 30 30 5 5 
Summary MSoP (Risky chosen; m added to Safe):a 
N. 13 59 83 53 64 
Mean 3.31 2.69 2.37 6.67 5.46 
Median 2.00 2.50 2.50 6.00 4.55 
St. Dev. 1.71 1.33 1.39 3.96 4.42 
Upper bound MSoP 10 10 10 55 55 
Too Early vs. Too Late (Safe chosen):a,b 
£2 added 8/65 vs. 9/11*** 12/17 vs. 0/13*** 1/2 vs. 1/4 14/19 vs. 0/17*** 8/8 vs. 0/17*** 
 
(12.3% vs. 81.8%) (70.6% vs. 0%) (50% vs. 25%) (73.7% vs. 0%) (100% vs. 0%) 
£4 added 3/46 vs. 25/30*** 4/4 vs. 1/26*** 0/0 vs. 0/6† 1/1 vs. 0/35** 0/0 vs. 0/25† 
 
(6.5% vs. 83.3%) (100% vs. 3.8%) (-% vs. 0%) (100% vs. 0%) (-% vs. 0%) 
Too Early vs. Too Late (Risky chosen):a,b 
£2 added 13/13 vs. 0/0† 27/45 vs. 3/14** 34/53 vs. 6/30*** 12/50 vs. 1/3 23/50 vs. 4/14 
 
(100% vs. -%) (60% vs. 21.4%) (64.2% vs. 20%) (24% vs. 33.3%) (46% vs. 28.6%) 
£4 added 3/4 vs. 1/9* 15/17 vs. 0/42*** 13/16 vs. 3/67*** 15/43 vs. 5/10 25/41 vs. 1/23*** 
  (75% vs. 11.1%) (88.2% vs. 0%) (81.3% vs. 4.5%) (34.9% vs. 50%) (61% vs. 4.3%) 
a - Sample restricted to 89 participants who did not violate dominance either in their choices or in their MSoP judgments for the four FOSD pairs. 
b - Asterisks indicate significance in a two-tail Fisher exact test: * = 10%, ** = 5%, *** = 1%. † = not enough observations for statistical test. 
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Table 3   (continued) 
 
  SR6 SR7 SR8 SR9 SR10 
Safe lottery (£9, 0.25; £0, 0.75) (£15, 0.2; £0, 0.8) (£25, 0.15; £0, 0.85) (£9, 0.25; £0, 0.75) (£15, 0.2; £0, 0.8) 
Risky lottery (£15, 0.2; £0, 0.8) (£25, 0.15; £0, 0.85) (£45, 0.1; £0, 0.9) (£45, 0.1; £0, 0.9) (£45, 0.1; £0, 0.9) 
EV difference  0.75  0.75  0.75  2.25  1.50  
Summary MSoP (Safe chosen; m added to Risky):a 
N. 15 25 21 28 33 
Mean 1.40 1.63 2.13 2.24 2.10 
Median 1.30 1.50 1.50 1.85 2.00 
St. Dev. 1.07 1.42 2.31 1.59 1.34 
Upper bound MSoP 9 15 25 9 15 
Summary MSoP (Risky chosen; m added to Safe):a 
N. 74 64 68 61 56 
Mean 1.90 2.58 4.09 5.13 4.70 
Median 2.00 2.50 4.00 4.50 4.25 
St. Dev. 0.90 1.14 2.26 2.90 2.88 
Upper bound MSoP 6 10 20 36 30 
Too Early vs. Too Late (Safe chosen):a,b 
£2 added 4/4 vs. 0/11*** 9/11 vs. 1/14*** 7/8 vs. 0/13*** 13/14 vs. 1/14*** 15/17 vs. 1/16*** 
 
(100% vs. 0%) (81.8% vs. 7.1%) (87.5% vs. 0%) (92.9% vs. 7.1%) (88.2% vs. 6.3%) 
£4 added 1/1 vs. 0/14* 2/2 vs. 0/23*** 2/2 vs. 0/19*** 5/5 vs. 0/23*** 4/4 vs. 3/29*** 
 
(100% vs. 0%) (100% vs. 0%) (100% vs. 0%) (100% vs. 0%) (100% vs. 10.3%) 
Too Early vs. Too Late (Risky chosen):a,b 
£2 added 32/40 vs. 5/34*** 37/50 vs. 1/14*** 36/59 vs. 1/9*** 26/58 vs. 1/3 25/48 vs. 4/8 
 
(80% vs. 14.7%) (74% vs. 7.1%) (61% vs. 11.1%) (44.8% vs. 33.3%) (52.1% vs. 50%) 
£4 added 2/2 vs. 0/72*** 7/10 vs. 3/54*** 28/36 vs. 2/32*** 24/39 vs. 5/22*** 26/35 vs. 4/21*** 
  (100% vs. 0%) (70% vs. 5.6%) (77.8% vs. 6.3%) (61.5% vs. 22.7%) (74.3% vs. 19%) 
a - Sample restricted to 89 participants who did not violate dominance either in their choices or in their MSoP judgments for the four FOSD pairs. 




Table 3   (continued) 
 
  SR11 SR12 SR13 SR14 SR15 SR16 
Safe lottery (£15, 0.8; £0, 0.2) (£9, 1) (£9, 1) (£18, 0.8; £3, 0.2) (£12, 1) (£12, 1) 
Risky lottery (£45, 0.4; £0, 0.6) (£45, 0.4; £0, 0.6) (£15, 0.8; £0, 0.2) (£48, 0.4; £3, 0.6) (£48, 0.4; £3, 0.6) (£18, 0.8; £3, 0.2) 
EV difference  6.00  9.00  3.00  6.00  9.00  3.00  
Summary MSoP (Safe chosen; m added to Risky):a 
N. 47 43 53 27 26 44 
Mean 3.39 2.85 2.29 1.92 1.83 2.04 
Median 3.00 2.80 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 
St. Dev. 1.81 1.28 1.19 1.60 0.98 1.46 
Upper bound MSoP 15 9 9 15 9 9 
Summary MSoP (Risky chosen; m added to Safe):a 
N. 42 46 36 62 63 45 
Mean 5.77 6.72 2.28 4.27 5.00 2.26 
Median 5.00 6.25 2.50 4.00 5.81 2.30 
St. Dev. 2.52 2.99 0.80 2.30 3.21 0.89 
Upper bound MSoP 30 36 6 30 36 6 
Too Early vs. Too Late (Safe chosen):a,b 
£2 added 33/39 vs. 2/8*** 25/35 vs. 1/8*** 21/37 vs. 4/16** 11/14 vs. 3/13*** 9/16 vs. 3/10 14/25 vs. 5/19* 
 
(84.6% vs. 25%) (71.4% vs. 12.5%) (56.8% vs. 25%) (78.6% vs. 23.1%) (56.3% vs. 30%) (56% vs. 26.3%) 
£4 added 15/17 vs. 5/30*** 9/10 vs. 4/33*** 4/6 vs. 5/47*** 2/2 vs. 6/24 0/0 vs. 4/26† 2/3 vs. 5/41* 
 
(88.2% vs. 16.7%) (90% vs. 12.1%) (66.7% vs. 10.6%) (100% vs. 25%) (-% vs. 15.4%) (66.7% vs. 12.2%) 
Too Early vs. Too Late (Risky chosen):a,b 
£2 added 12/42 vs. 0/0† 8/43 vs. 1/3 20/28 vs. 1/8*** 18/57 vs. 1/5 14/59 vs. 1/4 21/32 vs. 3/13** 
 
(28.6% vs. -%) (18.6% vs. 33.3%) (71.4% vs. 12.5%) (31.6% vs. 20%) (23.7% vs. 25%) (65.6% vs. 23.1%) 
£4 added 17/34 vs. 1/8 14/39 vs. 3/7 1/1 vs. 2/35* 14/35 vs. 11/27 12/38 vs. 10/25 1/2 vs. 7/43 
  (50% vs. 12.5%) (35.9% vs. 42.9%) (100% vs. 5.7%) (40% vs. 40.7%) (31.6% vs. 40%) (50% vs. 16.3%) 
a - Sample restricted to 89 participants who did not violate dominance either in their choices or in their MSoP judgments for the four FOSD pairs. 
b - Asterisks indicate significance in a two-tail Fisher exact test: * = 10%, ** = 5%, *** = 1%. † = not enough observations for statistical test. 
 
